

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 01538 01 OF 02 061811Z

47

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-09 IO-10 ISO-00

ACDE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-07 L-02

NASA-01 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 PRS-01

OES-03 SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01 SAM-01 /111 W

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P R 061701Z MAR 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1191

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 01538 01 OF 02 061811Z

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DISTO

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PARM, CCD  
SUBJECT: CCD 656TH PLENARY MEETING, MARCH 6, 1975

SUMMARY: IN MAR 6 CCD PLENARY, REPS SWEDEN, IRAN AND CANADA MADE SUBSTANTIVE STATEMENTS. SWEDISH REP STRESSED NUCLEAR ISSUES, PRESSED SUPERPOWERS FOR ACTION ON CW, AND SUPPORTED EXPERTS' MEETING ON ENMOD. IN WIDE-RANGING TOUR D'HORIZON IRAN FOCUSED ON NUCLEAR PROBLEMS AND AFFIRMED THAT IT HAD RENOUNCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION. CANADIAN REP CALLED FOR INTENSIFICATION OF CCD'S WORK PATTERN, ESPECIALLY RE ORGANIZATION OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE (NFZ) STUDY, AND HE PROPOSED INTERSESSIONAL MEETING OF GOVERNMENT EXPERTS TO ASSIST IN FOCUSING CCD'S APPROACH TO ENMOD RESTRAINTS. ROMANIAN REP MADE BRIEF, UNSCHEDULED INTERVENTION CALLING FOR ALTERATIONS IN CCD'S PROCEDURES. END SUMMARY.

1. MADAME THORSSON (SWEDEN) SAID VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENTS, WHILE UNDOUBTEDLY CONTRIBUTING TOWARD STRATEGIC PARITY AND HOPEFULLY REDUCING LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR WAR, DID NOT REPRESENT CONTRIBUTION TO DISARMAMENT. AGREEMENTS ACTUALLY PERMITTED FORCE INCREASES AND "ALMOST UNLIMITED POSSIBILITIES FOR QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AIMED AT GREATER DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY." IN FACT, ACCORDING TO THORSSON, THEY SEEMED TO RENDER MEANINGFUL DISARMAMENT MEASURES IMPROBABLE FOR CONSIDERABLE TIME TO COME; HOWEVER, SWEDEN HAD APPRECIATED USREP'S OPENING STATEMENT INDICATING THAT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON FORCE CEILING REDUCTIONS MIGHT START IN RELATIVELY NEAR TERM. IN SAME CONTEXT, THORSSON SAID THAT IF NPT LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 03 GENEVA 01538 01 OF 02 061811Z

REVIEW CONFERENCE WERE TO BE SUCCESSFUL, NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES MUST GIVE EVIDENCE THEY TAKE ARTICLE VI OBLIGATIONS (NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT) SERIOUSLY. CTB AGREEMENT WOULD REPRESENT "INDISPENSABLE STEP" TOWARD ARTICLE VI IMPLEMENTATION.

2. ON RELATED ISSUE OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNES) THORSSON THOUGHT CCD SHOULD DEFER DETAILED CON-

SIDERATION TO SUMMER SESSION IN VIEW OF IAEA WORK IN FIELD AND NPT REVCON. HOWEVER, SHE ALSO EXPRESSED HOPE THAT 1975 UNGA WOULD HAVE CHANCE TO REVIEW ENTIRE PNE QUESTION, FORMING BASIS FOR "MUCH NEEDED INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS."

3. THORSSON SAID WHOLE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM "WILL GROW MORE COMPLEX AND SINISTER" WITH RAPID EXPANSION OF CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS, PARTICULARLY RAPID INCREASE IN PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION. SHE SAID SWEDEN HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN SOVREP'S VOICING SIMILAR CONCERN IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT. ACCORDING TO THORSSON IT IS CLEAR THAT INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE TECHNOLOGY UP TO NOW HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENT. NPT HAS ONLY PARTLY FULFILLED ITS AIM; IAEA SAFEGUARDS ARE DESIGNED ONLY TO DETECT, BUT NOT PREVENT PHYSICALLY, DIVERSION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL; AND INTERNATIONAL RULES FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY ARE LACKING. SWEDEN, SHE SAID, INTENDED TO TAKE UP ALL THESE MATTERS AT NPT REVCON.

4. ON ENMOD, THORSSON SAW PROBLEMS IN DELIMITING CIVILIAN ASPECTS OF PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED NEED FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN CCD AND UNEP IN THIS CONNECTION. SHE THOUGHT "HIGHLY COMPLEX" ENMOD PROBLEM REQUIRED DETAILED EXPERT CONSIDERATION IN CCD BEFORE ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS COULD BE ACHIEVED; EXPERTS WOULD STUDY USSR DRAFT CONVENTION "AND OTHER MATERIAL WHICH MIGHT BE PUT FORWARD."

5. THORSSON EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT IMPENDING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION. SHE SAID SWEDEN STILL FOUND UNSATISFACTORY THE POSSIBILITY OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 04 GENEVA 01538 01 OF 02 061811Z

SECURITY COUNCIL VETO EVEN OF INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINT BASED ON ALLEGED BREACH OF CONVENTION; NEVERTHELESS CONVENTION WOULD SERVE USEFUL PURPOSE SINCE IT CONTAINS ACTUAL DISARMAMENT MEASURES. SWEDEN THEREFORE HAD SIGNED CONVENTION FEB 27.

6. IN CONTRAST TO MOVEMENT ON BW, THORSSON WENT ON, "PRESENT STALEMATE" ON CW WAS CAUSE FOR DISTRESS. CITING ROZHCHIN'S MAR 4 STATEMENT CONCERNING "FURTHER STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN THIS MATTER," SHE SAID SWEDEN WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING FROM US AND SOV REPS WHEN "ACTIVE SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS" (VLADIVOSTOK) IN CONNECTION WITH A JOINT INITIATIVE ON MOST DANGEROUS, LETHAL MEANS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE WOULD RESULT IN PROPOSALS TO CCD FOR CONVENTION. VERIFICATION CLAUSES OF

SUCH A CONVENTION, SHE ADDED, SHOULD NOT BE MODELLED ON THOSE OF BWC.

7. AMB BARTON (CANADA) SAID CTB AND CW REMAIN "CONSTANT PRIORITIES" IN CCD DELIBERATIONS. COMMITTEE, HE SAID, SHOULD RESPOND EFFECTIVELY, BUT ALSO MUST JUSTIFY CONFIDENCE DEMONSTRATED BY UNGA'S REQUEST THAT IT ADDRESS ITSELF TO NFZS, ENMOD, AND ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS OF PNES. ALL THIS, HE INDICATED, REQUIRED INTENSIFICATION OF CCD'S "TRADITIONAL UNHURRIED AND UNSTRUCTURED PATTERN OF WORK."

8. ON NFZ STUDY, BARTON NOTED VARYING APPROACHES TO NFZS AND THOUGHT IT COULD PROVE HARD FOR EXPERTS TO DETERMINE "FIRM 'CRITERIA' OR EVEN 'GUIDELINES' FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE NFZ PROPOSALS." ON ENMOD BARTON NOTED CCD WAS "MOVING INTO UNEXPLORED TERRITORY"; IN INTEREST OF FOCUS AND DEFINITION HE PROPOSED INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS TO EXAMINE DIMENSIONS OF PROBLEM AND IDENTIFY SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED ("AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT MUST BE ADEQUATELY PRECISE."). BARTON SAW SEQUENCE OF NEEDS AS INFORMATION, AGREEMENT ON WHAT CONSTITUTES REAL DANGER IN TERMS OF UNGA RES, AND FINALLY AGREEMENT ON CONTAINING SUCH DANGERS IN UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTABLE CONVENTION.  
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PAGE 05 GENEVA 01538 01 OF 02 061811Z

9. BARTON ALSO ADVOCATED DELAYING CCD CONSIDERATION OF PNES UNTIL SUMMER SESSION, EXPRESSING HOPE THAT BY THEN US AND USSR MIGHT BE IN POSITION TO INFORM COMMITTEE OF PROGRESS OF PNE DISCUSSIONS IN FRAMEWORK OF TTB. HE ADDED THAT DELS WOULD BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING ABOUT FURTHER US-SOVIET BILATERALS IN REGARD TO NUCLEAR TESTING ISSUE, STATING CANADA CONTINUED TO HOPE NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD BEAR IN MIND OTHERS' INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IN SCIENTIFIC DATA EXCHANGE, ESPECIALLY SEISMOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS.

10. ON CW, BARTON NOTED THAT AT INFORMAL EXPERTS' MEETING DURING CCD SUMMER 1974 SESSION THERE APPEARED TO BE WIDE IF NOT UNANIMOUS ACCEPTANCE OF IDEA OF CW TREATY WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE PARTIAL MEASURES AS BEGINNING. RECALLING CANADIAN CONCEPT OF "PHASED COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT" IN JULY 16 STATEMENT, HE SAID CANADA  
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PAGE 01 GENEVA 01538 02 OF 02 061829Z

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INFO OCT-01 AF-06 ARA-06 EUR-12 EA-06 NEA-09 IO-10 ISO-00

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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 01538 02 OF 02 061829Z

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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 1538

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11. AMB FARTASH (IRAN) DELIVERED WELL-ORGANIZED TOUR D'HORIZON ON IRAN'S DISARMAMENT POLICIES AND THOSE RELATING TO SPECIFIC ISSUES BEFORE CCD. FARTASH OBSERVED THAT IRAN HAD SIGNED AND RATIFIED EVERY RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL ACCORD. BY ADHERING TO NPT AND LTBT IRAN HAD RENOUNCED NUCLEAR OPTION. ON OTHER HAND, IT SOUGHT TO BENEFIT FROM EXPANDING PEACEFUL USE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY; MINDFUL OF DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH USE, IT HAD CONCLUDED IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.

12. IN CONTRAST, FARTASH CONTINUED, NOT A SINGLE NUCLEAR WEAPON HAS BEEN DESTROYED UNDER DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT, AND NUCLEAR THREAT IS EVEN GREATER BECAUSE OF PROFUSION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. NUCLEAR FREE ZONES REPRESENTED HIGHLY RELEVANT WAY OF ADDRESSING THIS DANGER; FARTASH RECALLED SHAH'S MESSAGE TO 1974 UNGA IN CONNECTION WITH IRANIAN-EGYPTION MIDDLE EAST NFZ PROPOSAL AND SAID IRAN WAS GRATIFIED BY UNGA'S RESPONSE.

13. IRAN ALSO WOULD FOLLOW WITH SPECIAL INTEREST PROGRESS ON UNGA RES ON SOUTH ASIAN NFZ, SUPPORTED AFRICAN NFZ, AND DESPITE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH ALL THESE PROPOSALS TOOK HEART FROM SUCCESS REPRESENTED BY LATIN AMERICAN NFZ TREATY (TALTELCO). ESSENTIAL FOR ANY NFZ AGREEMENT, FARTASH SAID, WAS PLEDGE BY NUCLEAR POWERS TO RESPECT ZONE AND NEVER TO USE OR THREATEN TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ANY STATE ENTERING INTO AGREEMENT.

14. ON NPT, FARTASH SAID IRAN WOULD LIKE TO SEE  
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PAGE 03 GENEVA 01538 02 OF 02 061829Z

BROADEST POSSIBLE REALIZATION OF ARTICLE IV (COOPERATION IN PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY), SAW SOME PROGRESS RE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS AND HOPED CCD WOULD BE INFORMED OF RESULTS OF CURRENT US-USSR NEGOTIATIONS ON PNES IN CONNECTION WITH TTB.

15. MOST EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATE WAY TO ENFORCE NPT, FARTASH CONTINUED, WOULD BE NUCLEAR POWERS' FULFILLMENT OF THEIR ARTICLE VI OBLIGATIONS TO HALT NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. ON VLADIVOSTOK AND CURRENT SALT NEGOTIATIONS, HE STRESSED VIEW THAT CEILINGS WERE TOO HIGH (CITING NEW YORK TIMES EDITORIAL IN SUPPORT,) EXPRESSED HOPE THAT LATITUDE FOR FURTHER WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE NARROWED BY NEW AGREEMENT, AND URGED SUPERPOWERS TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIELD.

16. ON OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, FARTASH SAID IRAN HOPED FOR PROGRESS ON INDIAN OCEAN PEACE ZONE AND STRONGLY SUPPORTED WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (WDC) -BUT REGARDED UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION AS "ALL IMPORTANT FACTOR" AND STRESSED NEED FOR CAREFUL CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS. THUS IT WAS NECESSARY TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY ON WDC IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

17 TURNING TO SPECIFIC CCD ISSUES, FARTASH EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT VERIFICATION DIFFERENCES CONTINUED TO BLOCK AGREEMENT ON BOTH CTB AND WC AND HOPED FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY ON SUPERPOWERS' PART. SEISMOLOGY ADVANCES AND SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE, HE SAID, HAD WEAKENED AGREEMENTS RE NECESSITY OF ON-SITE INSPECTION. HE CALLED TTB TOO WEAK AN EFFORT ON SUPERPOWERS' PART, SAYING IRAN WAS "DISAPPOINTED IN ITS PERMISSIVENESS" AND DELAYED EFFECTIVE DATE. TTB WOULD BE USEFUL ONLY IF IT PROMPTED EFFORTS TOWARD MORE EFFECTIVE TEST BAN AND DID NOT SERVE AS EVASION OF FURTHER WORK TOWARD CTB.

18. ALSO IN TEST BAN CONTEXT, FARTASH SAID PNES NEED NOT DETRACT FROM CTB BUT MUST BE UNDER MOST STRINGENT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL PROCEDURES (SUCH AS IAEA'S) INCLUDING ADEQUATE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION. IRAN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
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PAGE 04 GENEVA 01538 02 OF 02 061829Z

WELCOMED CALL FOR CCD STUDY OF PNE ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTED COMMITTEE DRAW ON IAEA EXPERTISE.

19. FARTASH VIEWED CW AS MORE PROMISING ARMS CONTROL FIELD THAN TEST BAN. CITING 1974 US/USSR SUMMIT STATEMENT, HE SAID IRAN AWAITED SEQUEL IN FORM OF JOINT INITIATIVE. MEANWHILE "INTERESTING" JAPANESE DRAFT CW TREATY WAS WORTH CCD CONSIDERATION. COUPLED, WITH BWC, FARTASH SUMMED UP, A CW TREATY WOULD BE GENUINE DISARMAMENT MEASURE.

20. AMB ENE (ROMANIA), NOT ON SPEAKERS' LIST, MADE PROCEDURAL INTERVENTION STIMULATED, HE SAID, BY GARCIA ROBLES' (MEXICO) CONCLUDING STATEMENT AT CCD SUMMER 1974 SESSION AND BY ALL OF MORNING'S PREVIOUS SPEAKERS. ENE ASSERTED THAT CENTRAL QUESTION HE WAS ADDRESSING WAS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNGA RESOLUTIONS AND CCD'S WORK. FOR EXAMPLE, CONTEMPLATED INFORMAL MEETING OF CCD MEMBERS ON NFZ STUDY SHOULD NOT REOPEN QUESTIONS ALREADY DECIDED BY UNGA. ROMANIA UNDERSTOOD NFZ STUDY RES AS ESTABLISHING THAT EXPERT'S GROUP WOULD BE AUTONOMOUS AND OPEN TO ALL INTERESTED PARTIES.

21. MORE GENERALLY, ENE WANT ON, THERE WERE TWO  
CENTRAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM CCD'S AMBIGUOUS RALATIONSHIP  
TO UNGA RESES: A) IT IS NEVER KNOWN JUST WHEN  
CCD WILL RECONVENE; B) UNDER PRESENT PRACTICE CCD  
EASILY "OVERLOOKS" SOME RESES. ENE THOUGHT CCD  
AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE SHOULD RECONVENE ASAP AFTER  
UNGA CONCLUSIN AND THAT CCD SHOULD REPORT TO NEXT UNGA  
ON WHAT HAD BEEN DONE WITH RESPECT TO ALL GIVEN YEAR'S  
RESES. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOLLOW SUCH  
PRACTICES, ENE SAID, SO WHAT CAN'T CCD?

22. POINTING TO GEOGRAPHICAL SCATTERING OF OFFICIALS  
(BOTH UN AND NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES) RESPONSIBLE FOR  
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF CCD'S WORK, ENE ALLEGED THAT "GOOD  
CARE HAS BEEN TAKEN" THAT WHOLE CCD SYSTEM IS DIVIDED  
INTO NUMBER OF ISLOATED PARTS. THIS PLUS COMMITTEE'S  
PREVIOUS CONCENTRATION IN PARTICULAR SESSION ONE ONE  
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PAGE 05 GENEVA 01538 02 OF 02 061829Z

OR TWO TOPICS, "SOMETIMES NOT MOST URGENT ONES", HAS  
BROUGHT VERY LITTLE RESULT DURING PAST THREE OR FOUR  
YEARS. CCD, ENE CONCLUDED, HAD DUTY TO DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH  
DISARAMENT PROBLEMS BEFORE UNGA TOOK IT UPON ITSELF  
TO DO SO.

23. NEXT PLENARY TUESDAY, MAR 11. DALE

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## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ENMOD, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS, NUCLEAR FREE ZONES, MEETING REPORTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 06 MAR 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975GENEVA01538  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
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**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 8  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 02 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <02 APR 2003 by KelleyW0>; APPROVED <02 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
05 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CCD 656TH PLENARY MEETING, MARCH 6, 1975 SUMMARY: IN MAR 6 CCD PLENARY, REPS SWEDEN, IRAN AND  
**TAGS:** PARM, CCD  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006